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 Abstract 
Liberalisation of energy markets has been gradually introduced in many countries during the last 20 
years. The liberalisation has led to concerns regarding the state of competition on the markets and fear 
that market power exists that can result in less efficiency gains than what is expected from 
liberalisation. Also concerns that specific consumer groups will be hurt by limited competition in 
markets have been raised.  
Much of the concern have concentrated on electricity markets, but the development of energy sectors 
with integration of activities within natural gas, electricity and the oil sector create the need to 
examine market power aspects across these markets. 
This paper examine concentration trends in the Northern European markets for electricity and 
natural gas, combined with regional district heating aspects especially concerning the Danish 
situation. The situation with natural gas companies supplying both small-scale CHP and retail heat 
customers is discussed. Which changes of regulatory regime for domestic heat customers should be 
considered when the natural gas market is being liberalised.    
The interlinked nature of the energy markets is described and examples of impacts from one market 
with limited competition to other markets with seemingly well functioning competition are given. 
Both aspects related to exercise of market power across markets and the regulatory response is 
considered. The specific case of large CHP production facilities with output on the regulated district 
heating market and the competitive nordic electricity market is examined. How much of the 
fluctuations in price experienced in electricity markets should be reflected in the price of heat 
supplies? To which degree do the heat customers have to bear the burden of low electricity market 
prices?     
Regulation of liberalised markets is discussed focusing on the interaction between one regulated 
market and the related energy markets that are liberalised. Existing regulation on the markets are 
compared to a situation where liberalisation of some markets puts pressure on other markets. 
We conclude that the most likely integration activity in the Danish market will be the bundling of 
energy goods (natural gas and electricity) to retail customers and the integration of gas-fired CHP 
producers with gas companies.    
Keywords: Energy markets, liberalisation, market power, regulation 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The liberalisation of energy markets during the last decade has drawn much attention to 
the potential use of market power. The literature has concentrated on the electricity sector as 
the first sector to be exposed to widespread liberalisation. Though there are also studies 
examining the natural gas sector. However, only a very few studies examine the potential 
threat of market participants engaged in several energy markets and exercising market 
power across interlinked energy markets.  
Market power issues in the power sector has been extensively studied, (Bower, Bunn, and 
Wattendrup, 2001),(Garcia and Arbelaez, 2002),(Guan, Ho, and Pepyne, 2001),(Gørtz and 
Hansen, 1999),(Andersson and Bergman, 1995). There are however a limited number of 
studies studying the market power issues across the energy markets (Bunn, Dyner, Larsen, 
and ., 1997). This study focuses on market power arising in the electricity market based on a 
dominant producer that has generating gas-based capacity. Such a producer might use an 
option to withdraw some gas-based capacity to increase both spot market prices and 
volatility. It is possible that the gas can be resold without losses or even with some profit. 
The gains to the producer will however, mainly be associated with increased price from 
production at the remaining capacity controlled by the dominant agent and secondarily 
from increased margens on forward contracts, hedging etc. 
Gas market liberalisation has among others been studied by (Lemon, 2002). Other studies 
consider price effects and positive welfare gains from liberalisation of both electricity and 
gas markets. In (Aune, Golombek, Kittelsen, Rosendahl, and Wolfgang, 2001) this is 
analysed in an equilibrium model of the western European markets. The results points to 
large potential gains, (50%) lower electricity prices and also lower gas prices. The 
combination of the two markets reinforce the price effects both as a result of the lower fuel 
prices and because the substitution options between natural gas and electricity in end-use 
force the gas price down1
Like many others we see a potential threat to a successful liberalisation from the existence 
of market power. However, market power reduction by strong regulatory incentives may 
lead to overinvestment that might be just as harmful as the welfare loss associated with too 
high prices. In other cases regulation in the form of not allowing cross sector activities such 
as sales of several energy products will not produce market outcomes that are better than 
having one market player exploiting the possible economies of scope. 
.   
This paper is organised with a description of price links and substitution characteristics of 
energy markets that are important for liberalisation developments in section 2. In section 3 
follows a discussion of the liberalisation and resulting consolidation of energy markets that 
are seen as specifically interesting from a Danish point of view. Thereafter follows section 4 
that argues why two specific integration developments in Denmark is seen as most likely 
and finally follows a policy discussion of the possible adaptation of regulatory policy.       
2. INTERDEPENDENT ENERGY MARKETS – PRICE LINKS AND SUBSTITUTION 
Considering the interdependencies between energy markets it must be noted that energy 
markets are connected in some ways that are to some extent similar 
 
a) Energy of one type is used as intermediate input (fuel) in other energy sectors 
b) Different kinds of energy are substitutes in end use demands 
c) There are products that can be supplied in bundles to retail customers with economies of 
scope 
                                                     
1 They assume natural gas supply as exogenous. 
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The first relation has the consequence that pricing of the one energy type is important for 
the output price of the final energy product. Electricity produced by natural gas is one 
example of this. Changes in natural gas, fuel oil or coal world market prices are therefore 
important for the pricing of converted energy such as electricity and district heat. 
Liberalising one energy market will thus have consequences for other energy markets. 
 
The second relation has the consequence that anyone selling or distributing energy 
products have to take into consideration the pricing of other energy goods that are close 
substitutes to their product. 
 
a) Fuel price chains 
Fuel price chains will be affected by market power or other market imperfections not only 
in the first primary fuel market, but also the final demand for input in production or private 
consumption will be affected. First a too high price on the primary energy product will lead 
to a reduction of the fuel used in energy conversion if there are substitutes available. This 
inefficiency will lead to a secondary inefficiency when the converted product has too high 
marginal production cost. Even though the fuel substitution can accommodate some of the 
price rise there will be a resulting rise in marginal production cost. In the end the increased 
price of converted energy will lead to a reduction in the use of this type of energy. The mix 
between inputs of capital labour and energy may be distorted and inefficiencies in 
production of other goods might be the result. Correspondingly the private consumption of 
energy might be reduced to an inefficient level where e.g. too much time and effort is spend 
on reducing energy consumption. 
As there is some difficulties related to the quantification of the right fuel price at first hand 
it might be that the distortion of prices as a result of market power in the primary fuel 
market just reduces some other distortion. For instance the absence of environmental taxes 
on primary fuels in combination with externalities associated with the use of this fuel would 
suggest that market power results in price increase just as what should be the result of 
internalising the externality cost. This example is just to point to that there might exist 
several price distortions in the fuel chain prices an that there is no definite answer to what is 
the effect of another distortion caused by the exploitation of market power.   
The effects of market imperfections such as market power in the primary fuel supply will 
thus have consequences also in the final energy markets even though the market for these 
products is seemingly well functioning with widespread competition. For instance a well 
functioning electricity market could pass an effect of too high gas prices on to the industrial 
customers. 
 
b) Energy supplied to markets with substitution options 
In many of the markets where energy products are sold there exist substitution options 
between energy types. These options have to be considered by any supplier to this market, 
which have some price setting power. Regulation of the energy types that are substitutes are 
often quite different. The energy policies have been designed to pursue different goals 
through time. The regulation of one market has effect on competing product markets. The 
same applies to market characteristics regarding competition. If one of the competing 
products are characterised by effective competition the product that are partly a substitute 
will be exposed to some competition even though the market by itself is characterised by 
limited competition as either an oligopoly or a monopoly.  
Example: For residential heating the supplier of natural gas have to take into account the 
possibility of expanding district heating and the possibility of switching back to gas oil along 
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with the possibility of some electricity supplier offering cheap electricity during night times.  
The scope for such substitution is however rather limited in the Danish case, mainly because 
the heat planning and district heat have already been expanded to the majority of potential 
locations. 
 
c) Bundling of energy products and other similar products 
There are possible economies of scope by supplying both electricity and natural gas or 
district heating to retail customers. This can however also be the origin of incentives to 
exploit market power from one market to another. A distributor that have market power in 
supplying one product might use this to bundle it with a product in which they have no 
market power. By supplying both to the customers they will enjoy economies of scope 
effects that cannot be exploited by the suppliers only engaged in one of the markets. 
3. LIBERALISATION AND CONSOLIDATION IN ENERGY MARKETS  
Liberalisation of energy markets opens up to consolidation both by allowing new ownership 
structures and the possibilities of profits in sectors that have until then been regulated by no 
profits principles. The unbundling of network and other activities also allows for new 
directions for consolidation e.g with integration of activities within different energy markets. 
The interesting question is then if there are indications that developments in the structure of 
energy markets that could create problems for the well-functioning of these markets. 
Liberalisation is among other arguments based on creating larger geographical markets that 
will allow more competition and increase effectiveness of the entire market as the most 
efficient producer and technology capture market shares. Consolidation will therefore not 
necessarily be any threat to the expected gains from liberalisation.  
The agents that until liberalisation had strong positions in the market will try to find means 
to maintain their position.   
 
Vertical integration: 
Vertical integration will be very likely to take place following the liberalisation. The 
unbundling of activities within the electricity sector has left separate companies responsible 
for production, transmission and sales. However, these activities can still have the same 
owners and some coordination is therefore still possible even though the transmission 
(system responsible) is regulated in detail. In some cases it is even possible that the link 
between sales activity and production could become more direct even with common 
ownership of the two activities. This might be the case in Denmark.  
In the fuel chain aspect there are also possibilities for vertical integration with fuel suppliers 
linking up with electricity producers etc. This is also happening, but has not yet been seen in 
Denmark. One option is also for considering possible gains from integrating the grid 
activities both with respect to transmission and the distribution grids. The main obstacle to 
this seems to be the different ownership structure, but there should be no specific argument 
about market power as both categories of grids are already heavily regulated.  
 
Horizontal integration:  
Consolidation of regional production and sales companies has taken place within the 
electricity sector in Europe. Direct mergers but also cross-ownership of companies have 
reduced the number of independent producers in the Northern European area. This creates a 
risk for market power arising in the new larger market, but so far it seems that the increase 
in market size have not been outpaced by the merger and alliance activities. This is said even 
though markets are not yet fully integrated with respect to price movements, but the threat 
of new entrants in parts of the regional market is real. In some areas including Denmark, the 
 5 
integration of the many smaller sales companies have not yet been widespread, but the 
change is underway. Horizontal integration of production of electricity is a treat to market 
functioning, but especially in areas where transmission constraints are effective a 
considerable part of the year. With respect to natural gas the problem could be that the 
dominant position of established sales companies in their regional markets is not challenged 
within a reasonable time span.   
 
Bundling of energy products: 
In the distribution of electricity there have been activities to create larger business units that 
could be more interesting for integration activities across distribution markets as oil, gas, 
electricity and heat. The small supply companies have in a few occasions been acquired by 
larger scale distributors of natural gas and oil. The other way around is that EO.N still 
pursues the merger with Ruhrgas in the very large scale business. 
 
The following types of bundling could be considered. 
Natural gas + electricity: These two products are not substitutes in the residential sector 
and the electricity is consumed in every single household. Therefore the gas supplier will be 
able to offer electricity to all of its existing gas customers.  This kind of integration therefore 
seems very likely to appear. For a market power perspective the fear is that if the locally 
dominant supplier of electricity  
 
District heat + electricity: Bundling of these two products seems another possibility 
especially in the larger district heat areas. The high coverage of the district heat within a 
specific area makes the integration of activities a relevant option for the two suppliers.  
Within the district heating area there will be no other supplier of electricity that can enjoy 
economies of scope in supplying both the heat and the electricity. Therefore an electricity 
supplier might accept to have a business as the regulated district heat supply without 
having the opportunity to earn profits on this part of operations.  
  
Gas oil + electricity: This bundle is also likely to appear, but the much more 
geographically distributed sales of gas oil and the more competitive market for gas oil 
supplies makes this less likely to result in market power. Also the most likely integration 
will be expanding by offering electricity to existing customers and not by acquisitions2
 
.  
Bundling might take place with other products of similar characteristics but outside the 
energy markets. This could be drinking water distribution or even with telecommunications 
(internet access, cable TV etc.).  
 
Liberalisation benefits and the possible distribution of these 
 
Liberalisation is widely expected to result in efficiency gains through increased competition 
in markets. It is however not evident who will benefit from the gains in 
efficiency/productivity. Because energy markets are so interdependent it is not clear 
whether increased competition in one market will benefit the end-users of that type of 
energy or it to a larger extent will be transmitted to the energy markets using the first type of 
energy as a production input. 
 
Example: Electricity markets which are being integrated in larger markets. 
                                                     
2 At least not the smaller regional electricity suppliers. 
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In a region with low production cost the integration with outside markets will lead to more 
exports if transmission is sufficient and subsequently to higher electricity prices in the 
region. Is this a positive outcome of the liberalisation? From the consumer of electricity in 
the region this will not directly be the case, but the rest of the electricity market will benefit 
from lower prices. In economic terms there will be total welfare gains because the electricity 
consumed will be produced more efficient on average. The consumer in the liberalising 
region would however be compensated in the cases where they indirectly own the 
production sources of electricity. This will hardly be to the same extent as the loss they suffer 
from higher prices and the liberalisation process would in most cases also mean that the 
production facilities are transferred to legal companies outside the reach of the individual 
customers and probably also the liberalisation means privatisation and partly collection of 
revenues from authorities (municipalities and government).  
For the integration this could be an advantage for other markets. Take e.g Norwegian gas 
that maybe is not competitive in the first isolated electricity case. With expanding electricity 
markets there will be higher electricity prices and now the natural gas based electricity 
might be more competitive because the final electricty market have been increased in size. If 
not exactly the case in Norway the situation where liberalisation of markets proceed in 
different speeds is quite likely and the existence of transmission barriers (lack of 
transmission capacity for either natural gas or electricity is also quite likely to occur. 
4. L IBERALISATION AND MARKET POWER IN THE DANISH ENERGY MARKETS 
 
Liberalisation in Denmark have lacked a bit behind the other Nordic countries with respect 
to electricity but it is probably a bit ahead of some other European countries. For natural gas 
the situation is that liberalisation has just been initiated in recent years and in practice only a 
fraction of total supply has been exposed to competition. As the third market district heat is 
generally a natural monopoly, even though some market setup has been made in the 
Copenhagen area.  
Market power for a small country as Denmark (or for suppliers originating in the country) 
will be rather unstable as more internationally oriented companies enters the market. The 
existing suppliers will experience competition in the markets that are easiest to enter and 
where the price is most important because buyers have fuel substitution options. At the 
other end residential customers are the least accessible from new (foreign) suppliers and at 
the same time price is not the only parameter for competition, partly because these 
customers are levied the highest taxes and partly because they have limited substitution 
options (price elasticity is rather low).  
 
Liberalisation and market power related to natural gas 
The natural gas markets have longer than the electricity markets been dominated by state-
owned monopolies. Liberalisation has taken place in Britain quite early and is underway in 
many countries in Europe. In Denmark the liberalisation will comprise all customers by 
2004. The state owned DONG still control the major part of the market but competitors have 
entered the market especially for the very large customers as the power plants. The 
unbundling of grid activities (transmission) the sales activities etc. have been carried out 
even though the operations is still carried out under the same umbrella. The price of gas has 
historically been set by regulators to secure the financing of the gas infrastructure and was 
until a few years ago exempted from energy taxation.  
Market power in natural gas might have important implications for the electricity and 
district heat sectors in Denmark.  
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• Distortion in retail heat markets – technology choices 
• High retail natural gas prices due to district heating being based on natural gas as well 
makes it easier to raise gas prices. Substitution to other sources than district heat is 
rather limited in areas already covered by natural gas or district heating grids. 
   Distortion in heat markets will be limited if seen only at the retail level of gas versus other 
fuel for residential heating. The only distortion here could be wrong prices resulting in too 
high or two low consumption of heating in the houses. But this response to prices must be 
assumed to have a quite limited magnitude. There might be other ways that distortion can 
be seen, for example through the gas prices for district heating, that could affect the choice of 
technology when replacing the heat producing facilities. 
The following figure captures some of the characteristics of the Danish energy market with 
respect to market conditions and market structure. The emphasis is on the gas supplier and 
the residential customer. 
Gas supplier
CHP
producer
District
heating
plant
Residential
customer
District heat
grid
Electricity
markets
High competition
Subs titut ion with
fuel  oil
Low
substi tution
Com peti tion
(not yet
effective)
Limited
competition
(from 2004)
Low
substi tution
Price regulation
Price regulation
Price regulation
Industry
No price
regulation∗
Com peti tion
(so far
limited)
No price
regulation
Som e
substi tution
options
∗
Figure 1 Energy market characteristics in Denmark 
 
The figure reflects the market characteristics that are to be the case in the near future. In the 
figure the gas supplier is viewed as a Danish supplier with sales to all four categories of 
customers. Of the four customer categories it is the residential sector that seems most 
exposed to market power as this demand category has low substitution options and the 
competition is limited. Industrial demand is more flexible with respect to fuel choice and the 
competition is likely to emerge faster here than in the residential sector. The same applies for 
the supplies to district heating plants, but they probably have more limited options for fuel 
                                                     
∗ Until now the maximum price has been tied to the alternative fuel gas oil. From 2004 this is likely 
to be free 
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substitution. For these two groups the treat of future competition would limit the degree to 
which prices can exceed an anticipated competitive level. 
Bundling of energy products is most likely to be seen for the residential customers, where 
the gas supplies will be relatively uncontested and this situation therefore used to expand 
into the electricity market. For the other customer categories the bundling is either irrelevant 
(CHP, district heat) or less likely due to less electricity volume and the more constantly cost-
reduction search behaviour from industrial customers.  
 
A different case of integration of energy markets following liberalisation is the incentives 
that exist for CHP gas based producers and the gas supply companies. This integration 
might also result in the combined producer having a competitive advantage relative to other 
gas-based electricity producers.   
   
Gas supplier
(extract ion or long-term contract)
Gasfired CHP
producer
Heat
output
Electricity
markets
Gas price not
regul ated
Electricity
price not
regul ated
Heat price
regul ated
Gas pr ice
Electricity
price at
competitive
level
Heat price
based on high
gas costs
 
Figure 2 Incentives for gas and electricity producer integration in Denmark 
 
As both electricity and gas markets are being liberalised the ownership structure is opened 
for changes. Incentives for integration of activities exists that can be actualised when 
changes in ownership structure becomes possible as a result of the liberalisation. An 
example is the gas based electricity producer that has additional heat output. This part of 
output is still under regulation and the crucial point here is whether the gas price paid is the 
market price or not. This leaves an incentive for an integrated business to increase the 
transfer gas price to the CHP producer and have part of that increase paid by heat prices. 
This could be possible if the gas contracts are complex and therefore not easily valued.  
Integration will benefit from at least two other facts: 
 
1. Reduction of combined gas price risk (the supply businees will benefit at high prices, 
whereas the electricity will benefit at low gas prices)  
2. Flexibility of gas selling at times of unfavourable electricity prices when already in the 
gas market   
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Additional to these two aspects there might exist short-term options for affecting electricity 
spot market prices if the gas supplier is in control of additional electricity capacity and the 
gas-based production is the marginal technology. 
The incentives for integration exist for CHP producers that are already in operation, but for 
new capacity the situation will be dependent on the size of the heat market as new CHP heat 
capacity will only be relevant in the Danish case if old capacity is decommissioned.  
5. POLICY PERSPECTIVES - REGULATION DISPARITIES BETWEEN ENERGY 
MARKETS 
There are energy markets that are natural monopolies and there are elements of markets 
that are natural monopolies. These markets need some regulation, but it does not imply that 
there cannot be gains from allowing other operators in the energy field to expand their 
activities into natural monopoly areas. 
For electricity the liberalisation has raised the need to unbundle activities within 
transmission and distribution from the production and sale of electricity to allow the 
regulatory authorities to monitor the monopoly activities. The same is now underway for 
natural gas. For district heating this is only possible and relevant to a very limited extent. 
District heating is widespread in Denmark and some of the other Northern European 
countries. This is in most cases regionally isolated markets and is close to being natural 
monopolies. Therefore this sector is regulated in detail.  
Liberalisation of electricity and gas create incentives for integration that involves several 
markets and also relates to the heat market as shown in the previous section. Bundling of 
electricity and natural gas will most likely also occur in Denmark. This would raise the need 
for regulatory authorities to monitor the price developments for electricity in the areas 
where the supplier is also the dominating supplier of natural gas. The bundled supply of 
energy products should not be banned, but is should be assured that the products are 
available separate in the market at reasonable prices.   
The second likely development referred to in the previous section involves gas supplier 
integration with CHP producers. The regulatory response to such a development will have 
to deal with monitoring the gas transfer price that is used for the calculation of the regulated 
heat output price. It must be secured that companies in natural gas and CHP production that 
are part of the same company are not charging too high a gas price and passing too large a 
share of that to heat customers whereas cross-subsidising their electricity production that are 
to be sold in competitive markets. There can however be possible gains from integrating 
these two activities including reducing the risk premium that CHP producers will need to 
develop new capacity based on a volatile gas price.  
Finally a problem associated with the regulation of electricity production from small-scale 
CHP can be mentioned. Traditionally in Denmark the regulation of district heat and 
especially the small to medium scaled combined heat and power production have been 
regulated with guaranteed electricity prices, such that this was an indirect subsidy to 
facilitate the expansion with loal CHP production in Denmark. However, such policies have 
important implications for the electricity markets when it is transformed to a competitive 
market 
The share of the electricity output in Denmark supplied from regulated sources are quite 
high3
                                                     
3 The production from renewable energy (wind) and decentral CHP is rewarded with a regulated 
high price, that has exceeded the market with 50-100%. From 2004 the share of regulated production 
will probably be reduced when the decentral CHP production will have to operate based on the 
market price and the subsidy will be given without distorting production decisions.  
 (around 40%) and the market price change for the rest of supply therefore have to be 
larger to result in a price change relative to final consumers.  Secondly the effect for CHP 
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producers are that there are no price signals to response to changes in electricity market 
prices. In such cases it is not secured that e.g. reductions in production takes place at the 
production facility with the highest marginal production cost. As a result there will be a 
corresponding efficiency loss.    
The present development in Denmark is that regulation adopt to the market requirement 
for liberalisation with the main intention to open the way for possible competition without 
having to give away domestic markets for the companies in which the authorities have 
major interest and ownership. 
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